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Book	Review:	Crashed:	How	a	decade	of	financial
crises	changed	the	world	by	Adam	Tooze	(Part	2)
In	Crashed:	How	a	decade	of	financial	crises	changed	the	world,	author	Adam	Tooze	proposes	a
remarkably	consistent	narrative	of	the	2008	financial	crisis	and	its	political,	geopolitical	consequences
—	one	that	attempts	a	coherent	interpretation	of	the	global	and	European	crises.	In	part	two	of	his
review	of	this	seminal	work,	Shahin	Vallée	examines	Tooze’s	take	on	the	crisis	of	transatlantic
finance	and	the	existential	crisis	for	Europe	that	ensued.
Crashed:	How	a	decade	of	financial	crises	changed	the	world.	Adam	Tooze.	Allen	Lane	2018.	
Tooze’s	personal	and	educational	background—from	a	childhood	in	Germany
to	studies	in	the	UK,	and	teaching	in	the	US—offers	a	rich	and	rare	perspective
that	is	especially	useful	to	understanding	the	way	in	which	this	crisis	affects
Europe.	Tooze’s	central	argument	is	that	it	is	a	crisis	of	the	transatlantic	finance
that	emerged	after	the	fall	of	Bretton	Woods,	but	one	that	ought	to	leave	more
profound	scars	on	Europe	than	in	the	rest	of	the	world,	in	large	part	because	of
Europe’s	inadequate	policy	response.
Indeed,	a	central	feature	of	the	crisis	response	in	the	United	States	has	been
the	speed	with	which	the	Federal	Reserve	delivered	dollar	liquidity	to	US
financial	system	and	to	the	rest	of	the	world,	the	way	in	which	it	helped	rescue
and	buttress	its	financial	system,	and	the	fiscal	stimulus	it	provided	to	its
economy.	This	stands	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	European	approach,	which
objected	to	fiscal	expansion,	was	slow	in	backstopping	financial	markets,	and
opted	for	protracted	bail-outs	with	no	clean-up	of	the	banking	system	rather
than	rapid	recapitalization.
But	this	economic	divergence	rested	on	the	inadequate	nature	of	Europe’s
government	as	well	as	on	pre-existing	tensions	of	a	geopolitical	nature.	Tooze
argues	convincingly	that	since	the	invasion	of	Iraq	in	2003,	Europe	was	in	the
midst	of	an	identity	crisis	split	between	the	Old	and	the	New	Europe	that	raised
questions	about	Europe’s	boundaries	in	the	East	as	well	as	the	Southeast	(with	Turkey)	and	questioned	the
underlying	support	of	the	United	States	to	the	EU	and	NATO.	It	is	very	common	to	believe	today	that	the	transatlantic
tension	started	with	Trump’s	election;	but	in	reality,	it	has	spanned	four	American	presidential	terms	and	three
presidents.	Indeed,	the	Bush	administration	planted	the	seed	of	this	division	with	the	invasion	of	Iraq.	This	early	rift
was	soon	tested	and	exploited	by	Russia	with	the	invasion	of	Georgia	(2008).	The	rift	was	further	deepened	by
Obama’s	decision	to	renege	on	intervention	in	Libya	(2011),	a	move	that	effectively	left	France	holding	the	bag	alone
when	a	US	and	British	coalition	had	first	been	contemplated	and	finally	in	Syria	(2013).	This	brought	Russia	back
onto	the	world	stage.	The	global	financial	crisis,	as	well	as	the	debilitating	effect	of	the	euro	crisis,	may	have	played
an	important	role	in	empowering	Russia	to	undertake	the	occupation	of	Ukraine-Crimea	(2014),	which	despite	united
US	and	European	sanctions	left	Europe	uncertain	about	the	effectiveness	and	future	of	the	US	security	guarantee.
The	eastern	front
Given	this	geopolitical	backdrop,	it	is	quite	critical	to	analyse	the	way	in	which	the	EU	responded	to	the	crisis	in
Central-Eastern	Europe,	which	started	in	the	fall	of	2008	immediately	as	Lehman	Brothers	collapsed.	Tooze	argues
convincingly	that	“When	added	to	the	incomplete	project	of	the	eurozone,	and	the	missing	frame	for	the	transatlantic
financial	system,	the	unresolved	geopolitics	of	Europe’s	Eastern	question	completed	a	trifecta	of	unanswered
political	questions	that	hung	over	Europe	in	the	summer	of	2008	(p.139).
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While	I	share	the	view,	and	had	been	writing	myself,	about	the	neglect	with	which	the	ECB	treated	Central-Eastern
European	countries	during	the	crisis	by	refusing	to	extend	bilateral	swap	lines	that	would	have	helped	to	limit	capital
flight,	shore	up	their	banking	systems,	I	am	less	critical	of	the	European	Commission	and	not	entirely	convinced	that
this	was	the	turning	point	that	explains	the	turn	towards	Orban	and	the	rebirth	of	Christian	identity	politics	in	Hungary
and	more	broadly	in	the	EU,	as	suggested	by	Tooze	in	the	London	Review	of	Books	podcast.
Indeed,	my	recollection	is	that	in	October	of	2008	when	Hungary	asked	for	an	IMF	programme,	there	had	been	no
request	nor	even	a	warning	to	the	European	Commission,	which	created	some	commotion	in	Brussels.	People	like
me	sitting	in	at	BNP	Paribas	and	officials	at	the	Commission	were	preparing	for	the	use	of	the	Balance	of	Payment
Assistance	facility,	a	facility	used	by	the	EU	to	support	countries	experiencing	balance	of	payment	distress	and	last
used	in	Italy	in	the	1990s	and	were	somewhat	sidestepped	by	the	Hungarian	request	to	the	IMF.	The	EU	was	then
very	quick	to	ensure	that	the	IMF	would	not	be	dealing	with	an	EU	member	state	on	its	own.	I	therefore	do	not	fully
share	the	view	that	the	EU	shunned	Hungary	and	pushed	it	towards	a	humiliating	IMF	programme.	This	was	also
true	later	on	when	Latvia	would	follow	suit	and	come	under	and	EU/IMF	financial	assistance	programme.	It	was	the
European	Commission	which	pleaded	for	Latvia	to	be	able	to	maintain	its	peg	to	the	euro,	while	the	IMF’s	wanted	a
more	drastic	and	rapid	adjustment	by	way	of	a	currency	devaluation.
I	agree	nonetheless	that	at	a	later	stage,	in	the	beginning	of	2009	when	the	crisis	was	engulfing	all	of	Central-
Eastern	Europe	and	that	IMF	programmes	were	proving	insufficient	to	stabilize	the	situation,	several	proposals	from
the	Visegrad	Four	(Poland,	Hungary,	Slovakia	and	the	Czech	Republic)	to	offer	a	systemic	solution	were	rejected	by
Germany	and	the	EU.	It	is	at	this	moment	that	a	combination	of	public	and	private	sector	liquidity	support	was	most
needed.	Indeed,	countries	heavily	indebted	in	foreign	(mostly	euro	but	also	Swiss	Franc)	currency	would	have
greatly	benefited	from	a	more	active	European	Central	Bank	and	it	is	quite	incomprehensible	that	while	the	ECB	was
engaged	in	bilateral	swap	lines	with	Sweden,	the	Swiss	National	Bank	or	the	United	Kingdom,	it	would	refuse	to	offer
the	same	to	Latvia,	Poland,	and	Hungary,	countries	which,	after	all,	were	in	the	process	of	accession	to	the	single
currency.	The	decision	was	driven	by	a	certain	perception	of	credit	risk,	but	probably	more	importantly,	in	the	eye	of
Jean	Claude	Trichet,	these	countries,	didn’t	quite	deserve	the	same	treatment	AS	“core”	European	countries.
A	second	element	of	Europe’s	agony	over	Central-Eastern	Europe	relates	to	the	way	the	European	banking	system
managed	a	severe	collective	action	problem.	Here,	Tooze	probably	doesn’t	give	enough	importance	to	the	Vienna
Initiative,	a	public-private	sector	coordination	exercise	led	by	a	handful	of	policy	entrepreneurs	without	a	real
mandate	from	their	institutions	that	eventually	became	critical.	Piroska	Nagy,	a	Hungarian	economist	formerly	from
the	IMF	and	Erik	Berglof,	the	Chief	Economist	of	the	European	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development	(EBRD)
played	a	vital	role	in	organizing	a	collective	response	by	the	European	banking	sector	and	to	create	financial
incentivizes	through	a	form	of	public	private	partnership	that	would	offer	multilateral	financial	support	by	way	of	a
World	Bank,	EBRD	and	European	Investment	Bank	commitments.	As	a	young	economist	specialized	in	emerging
Europe,	I	was	deeply	involved	in	these	debates.	Although	the	Etat	Major	(senior	management)	of	BNP	Paribas
worried	of	the	potential	“stigma”	of	participating	in	such	a	collective	effort	alongside	other	European	banks	that	were
heavily	exposed	to	Central-Eastern	and	in	mortal	danger,	I	nonetheless	took	part	in	several	meetings	of	the	Vienna
Initiative	held	in	London.	My	modest	presence	allowed	the	organizers	to	show	some	interest	from	the	largest	bank	in
Europe,	even	though	it	was	never	to	make	a	formal	commitment	alongside	the	other	banks.	This	constructive
ambiguity	proved	also	very	useful	to	BNP	Paribas,	which	had	a	very	large	exposure	to	Ukraine	and	which	would
benefit	indirectly	and	substantially	from	a	collective	solution	found	for	the	rest	of	Central-Eastern	Europe.
Europe	and	the	single	currency
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On	the	question	of	Europe,	Tooze	provides	a	forensic	and	scary	account	of	how	rapidly	the	EU,	led	by	Germany	(but
immediately	followed	by	then-French	President	Nicolas	Sarkozy)	demanded	fiscal	consolidation	not	only	in	Europe
but	across	the	world	(in	particular	in	China	and	the	US).	And	how	dysfunctional	the	governance	of	the	euro	area	was
(and	remains).	He	finds	the	root	of	these	two	evils	(a)	in	Germany’s	demand	for	fiscal	rectitude,	which	had	been
elevated	with	the	introduction	of	debt	brake	“schuldenbremse”	in	2009	to	a	constitutional	priority	and	which	became
an	object	of	such	constitutional	patriotism	that	German	leaders	(and	voters)	felt	it	had	to	be	exported	to	the	rest	of
Europe	but	also	to	the	rest	of	the	world;	and	(b)	in	the	German	Constitutional	Court	ruling	on	the	Lisbon	treaty,	which
given	the	failure	of	the	constitutional	treaty	of	2005	took	a	very	conservative	view	towards	transfers	of	sovereignty
and	fiscal	resources.	These	two	pillars	would	remain	a	central	feature	of	Germany’s	attitude	through	the	crisis	and	to
this	day.	Yet	these	explanations	do	not	entirely	square	with	the	fact	that,	despite	its	dismal	governance	and
ordoliberal	bias,	the	EU	was	still	able	to	pass	as	early	November	2008	a	more	than	200	billion	euro	fiscal	stimulus,
equal	to	1	percent	of	EU’s	GDP.	While	this	is	proved	too	small	especially	because	most	of	the	subsequent	10	years
were	spent	undoing	this	first	policy	impulse,	it	speaks	to	the	ability	for	Europe,	despite	the	European	treaties
constraining/constitutionalizing	a	large	portion	of	economic	policy,	to	do	the	right	thing,	and	not	only	after	it	has
exhausted	all	other	possible	options.
Perhaps	is	it	on	the	issue	of	the	extent	of	the	architectural	deficiencies	of	the	single	currency	that	Tooze	leaves	the
reader	with	more	questions	than	answers.	He	seems	to	side	with	the	FT	columnist	Martin	Sandbu	on	the	view	that	a
federal	budget	and	a	genuine	fiscal	union	is	secondary.	And	yet	he	argues	convincingly	that	a	crisis	of	this	scale
“required	a	very	capable	state	indeed”.	It	is	hard	to	reconcile	both	views	and	argue	that	the	single	currency	could
adopt	the	sort	of	radical	banking	system	repair	policies	adopted	in	the	United	States	in	the	absence	of	a	federal
government	of	sorts	relying	instead	only	on	the	sum	of	national	responses	or	even	on	the	sort	of	incomplete	and
poorly	designed	banking	union	the	EU	has	today.	If	that	were	the	case,	then	there	would	be	no	relationship	between
fiscal	union	and	the	creation	of	a	State	apparatus,	which	defies	the	history	of	the	American	federation	for
example.	Tooze’s	account	of	this	failure	rests	on	the	supposed	fundamentally	inter-governmental	nature	of	the
Lisbon	Treaty,	which	I	take	some	issue	with.	It	is	not	that	the	letter	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty	that	was	intergovernmental	in
nature,	even	it	surely	didn’t	go	far	enough	in	endowing	the	euro	area	with	a	distinct	executive	power	controlled
democratically.	It	is	rather	the	fact	that	the	Lisbon	Treaty	was	hijacked	by	the	European	Council	during	the	crisis	that
corrupted	the	spirit	of	the	Treaty.	Here,	while	I	would	agree	with	Tooze	that	Germany	played	a	central	role	in	this
inter-governmental	turn,	its	behaviour	can	also	be	largely	explained	by	France’s	failure	to	ratify	the	constitutional
treaty	in	2005,	which	was	rightly	or	wrongly	understood	to	mean	that	pooling	of	sovereignty	and	the	build	out	of	a
transnational	democracy	a	la	Habermas	was	no	longer	possible.
But	the	more	important	point	might	be	about	the	future	of	European	politics,	which	could	face	more	severe
challenges	than	the	ones	visible	in	Trump’s	America.	Like	the	United	States,	Europe	has	been	profoundly	marked	by
the	emergence	of	insurgent	political	forces	caused	by	the	economic	hardship	and	the	inadequate	policy	response	to
the	crisis	and	the	perception	of	a	runaway	economic	and	political	elite	best	epitomized	—but	not	limited	to—	large
bank	bail-outs.
But	it	has	also	exposed	the	weakness	of	its	form	of	government	(lack	of	executive	authority)	and	its	democratic
deficit	(lack	accountability	and	control)	that	went	to	the	point	that	one	could	hear	in	Germany	after	the	removal	of
Berlusconi	from	office	and	the	taming	of	SYRIZA	in	Greece,	that	“Europe	does	regime	change	better	than	the	US”	(p.
412).	This	political	settlement,	which	is	perceived	by	most	Europeans	as	both	ineffective	in	dealing	with	financial,
economic,	geopolitical	crises	and	as	profoundly	undemocratic	leaves	Europe	more	profoundly	scarred	than	the	US	or
the	rest	of	the	world	from	the	aftershock	of	the	Lehman	collapse	10	years	ago.
This	idea	that	the	political	order	can	be	corrupted	by	what	Merkel	called	“codetermination	with	the	imperatives	of	the
markets”	or	that	it	can	be	entirely	replaced	by	what	Jean-Claude	Trichet	has	called	federalism	by	exception	(in
practice	the	entire	subordination	of	national	democracy	by	European	institutions	in	times	of	crisis)	leave	the	continent
most	confident	about	its	democratic	superiority	in	the	midst	of	an	existential	crisis.
Indeed,	we	are	marking	the	tenth	anniversary	of	Lehman’s	failure	and	the	ensuing	financial	crises	with	a	stabilized
world	economic	system	while	political	systems	from	the	United	States	to	Europe	continue	to	suffer	from	acute	PTSD.
This	post	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	LSE	Brexit	blog,	or	of	the	London	School	of
Economics.	Image	by	Jeremy	Weate,	(CC	BY	2.0).
Shahin	Vallée	is	a	PhD	candidate	at	the	LSE’s	European	Institute.
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